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neutral monism
In philosophy of mind, neutral monism is the view that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing the same elements, which are themselves "neutral", that is, neither physical nor mental.〔Craig, Edward. (1998). ''Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Routledge. p. 816. ISBN 0415-07310-3〕 This view denies that the mental and the physical are two fundamentally different things. Rather, neutral monism claims the universe consists of only one kind of stuff, in the form of neutral elements that are in themselves neither mental nor physical.
== History ==
Some of the first views of the neutral monism position about the mind–body relationship in philosophy can be attributed to C. D. Broad. In one of Broad's early works—known simply as "Broad's famous list of 1925" (see chapter XIV of ''The Mind and Its Place in Nature'')〔Broad, C. D. (1925). (''The Mind and Its Place in Nature'' ). London: Kegan Paul.〕—he stated the basis of what this theory was to become. Indeed, no less than nine out of seventeen of his mind-body relationship theories are now classified as falling under the category of neutral monism. There are few self-proclaimed neutral monists; most of the philosophers who are seen to have this view were classified after their deaths. Some examples of this are Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, Ernst Mach, Richard Avenarius, Kenneth Sayre and Joseph Petzoldt.
William James propounded the notion in his essay "Does Consciousness Exist?" in 1904 (reprinted in ''Essays in Radical Empiricism'' in 1912).〔James, William. (1912). (''Essays in Radical Empiricism ). New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.〕 Whately Carington in his book ''Matter, Mind, and Meaning'' (1949) advocated a form of neutral monism. He held that mind and matter both consist of the same kind of components known as "cognita" or sense data.〔Broad, C. D. (1950). ''Matter, Mind, and Meaning by W. Whately Carington. Philosophy''. Vol. 25, No. 94. pp. 275–277.〕〔Grenell, R. G. (1953). ''Matter, Mind and Meaning by Whately Carington''. The Quarterly Review of Biology. Vol. 28, No. 4. pp. 404–405.〕〔Oakeshott, Michael; O'Sullivan, Luke. (2007). ''The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence: Essays and Reviews 1926–51''. Imprint Academic. p. 286. ISBN 978-1845401801 "The doctrine that Mr Carington comes to favour is a form of Neutral Monism: the common constituents of mind and matter are sense-data or cognita. In themselves these cognita are neither mental nor material."〕
According to Stephen Stich and Ted Warfield, neutral monism has not been a popular view in philosophy as it is difficult to develop or understand the nature of the neutral elements.〔Stich, Stephen; Warfield, Ted. (2003). ''The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind''. Blackwell Publishing. pp. 20-21. ISBN 0-631-21774-6〕
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